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that there are ranges of significant experience which cannot be entered by processes of intellectual analysis, but where direct emotional response is authoritative and will stand the test of later criticism. The fine arts also tend

to quicken a highly complex type of emotional life and thus to refine those powers of sympathetic response which alone are capable of knowing God, but will know him only crudely unless they are attuned.

EZEKIEL'S HOLY STATE AND PLATO'S "REPUBLIC"

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There are some people who are foolish enough to believe that all ideals of the past are outgrown and worthless. Particularly are we tempted to think that Ezekiel, if not Plato himself, belongs to an age that has become merely archaeological. But nothing could be farther from the truth. The great problems of the past are still the problems of today, and the teachings of men like Ezekiel and Plato, when once they are understood, still have inspiration. Professor Baldwin's comparison of the social ideals of these two great men of the past is something more than an antiquarian discussion. It is a study of the originators of much that is idealistic in our modern world.

That Plato's *Republic* was one of the most epoch-making books of the world there can, of course, be no question. Few books have been more influential. Almost every, if not every vision of "a world unrealized" written since, has owed more or less to that philosopher with the soul of a poet, who, as from some "tower of speculation," looked into the future, and saw "the vision of the world, and all the wonder that would

be." He it was who suggested such treatises as St. Augustine's *De Civitate Dei*, and More's *Utopia*; and through the latter, Campanella's *Civitas Solis*, Bacon's *New Atlantis*, Harrington's *Oceana*, Hobbes's *Leviathan*, Sir John Eliot's *Monarchy of Man*, Hall's *Mundus alter et idem*, Filmer's *Patriarcha*, Butler's *Erewhon*, and Bellamy's *Looking Backward*.¹ Moreover the list is being continually supplemented by additions from

¹ Besides the speculative treatises mentioned above, we find another large group obviously inspired by the same original, but less speculative, and more playful in tone. To the latter class belong Barclay's *Argenis*, Bishop Goodwin's *Man in the Moon*, Bishop Wilkin's *Discovery of a World in the Moon*, Swift's *Gulliver's Travels*, Patoeck's *Peter Wilkins*, and Lytton's *Coming Race*. A fairly complete bibliography may be found in the *Nova Solyma*, edited by Rev. Walter Begley, London, 1902, II, 36 ff. Probably the most complete discussion of the whole subject is to be found in the *Geschichte des antiken Kommunismus und Sozialismus* by Dr. Robert Pöhlman, professor of ancient history in the University of Erlangen, two volumes, Munich, 1901. Many of the more playful Utopias are included in the *Voyages imaginaires, songes, visions, et romans cabalistiques*, 37 volumes. Paris, 1787.

the pens of men dissatisfied with things as they are, and dreaming of things as they think they ought to be. Indeed, so great has been the literary influence of Plato's book that there seems no reason to question the statement in a German work upon the ideal commonwealths,¹ in which the author says regarding the Greeks: "Sie bemühten sich, dem taumelnden Gange geographischer Träume eine festere Richtung zu geben, und auf sie ist irgendwie fast alles zurückzuführen, was in den letzten vierhundert Jahren in dieser Richtung geleistet worden ist."

While we may not question the value and influence of Plato's *Republic*, we may be justified in voicing a protest against the claim so often put forth that the book antedates all other ideal commonwealths. Such a claim has become almost a commonplace of criticism. Richard Garnett, for example, in his introduction to the "Everyman" edition of the *Republic*,² says of it, "It was probably the first in which full expression was given to the longing which must of necessity arise in the human heart when the cosmos and the individual appear

at odds, so tersely expressed in Fitzgerald's *Omar Khayyám*:

Ah Love! could you and I with Fate conspire
To grasp this sorry Scheme of Things entire,
Would we not shatter it to bits—and then
Re-mould it nearer to the Heart's Desire?"

In making this assertion Richard Garnett simply echoed what has often been claimed. In the *Schlaraaffia Politica* just referred to, we find in the beginning of the chapter on Plato's *Republic* (p. 7):

Auch hier, wenn wir die Staatsgebilde der Phantasie betrachten, muss sich das Blick zuerst auf Hellas richten. Gewiss ist die Vorstellung einer idealen Welt eine allgemein menschliche, und man kann die Gestellung der Gedanken darüber in altdischen Erzählungen, in arabischen Reisromanen und bei allen Völkern verfolgen.³ Aber die Griechen waren es, die jene Vorstellungen tiefer durchdachten.

Such statements are entirely misleading, for they fail to take account of an ideal commonwealth that preceded Plato's by some hundred and seventy-five years.⁴ This is Ezekiel's plan of a holy state which is embodied in the last

¹ The German work referred to is the *Schlaraaffia Politica*, published anonymously at Leipzig in 1892.

² *The Republic of Plato in Ten Books Translated from the Greek by H. Spens, D.D.*, Introduction, p. xii.

³ The expression of a longing for a better state of society, and an attempt to delineate an ideal social condition is certainly as old as literature itself. We find it in the Greek epic, in Homer's account of the island of the Phaeacians, who are described (*Od.* vi-viii) as living a life of undisturbed happiness far from the turmoil of the world, and from the madding crowd's ignoble strife. It is a kind of maritime Utopia, and is, probably, the source of the later legends of Atlantis.

⁴ The exact date of Plato's *Republic* is uncertain. We know that he died in 347 B.C. The book seems to have been known in 393, for in Aristophanes' *Ecclesiazusae*, a play acted in that year, some of the ideas found in the *Republic*, such as the community of goods and of women, are mercilessly ridiculed. Yet this evidence as to the date is inconclusive. For a discussion of it, see James Adam's edition of the *Republic*, I, 351 ff.

eight chapters¹ of the book that bears his name.

The neglect to take account of Ezekiel's holy state is the more amazing because its influence has been so great. Influential as Plato's *Republic* has been on literature, its effect upon the thought of the modern world is negligible in comparison to that exerted by Ezekiel's holy state, for the latter is the source of those ideals of Christendom associated with the phrase "the kingdom of God."² It is to him that the world owes the idea of a theocracy—the idea of a state in which God is the supreme ruler exercising his authority through the priests or ministers. It is an ideal that has appeared repeatedly in human history—in the rule of the popes in the Middle Ages, and in the Puritan sects of the seventeenth century like the "Fifth Monarchy Men" of the period of the Commonwealth in England. Indeed the Puritan commonwealth itself was, in part, an attempt to realize the ancient hope of Israel of a kingdom of the saints, a kingdom of God on earth. Such attempts have invariably failed, as the Puritan "kingdom of the saints" failed when the return of the Stuarts caused it to pass like a dream away, and as such schemes must always fail so long as human nature is what it is. For the

realization of Ezekiel's dream there is required such a citizenship as he assumed of men on whom God has bestowed a new heart and a new mind, who sin only unawares, and on whom, therefore, no punishment save an ecclesiastical penance need ever be imposed.

Though, of course, there is no connection between Plato's *Republic* and Ezekiel's holy state, there is, broadly speaking, a remarkable resemblance between them. Though it is to Ezekiel and not to Plato that the world owes the long-deferred hope of a kingdom of God on earth, such a hope was not peculiar to Ezekiel, but was Plato's also. His city of the perfect is, like Ezekiel's, a *civitas Dei*. It is a celestial commonwealth, a *παράδειγμα ἐν οὐρανῷ*,³ he calls it, a likeness of a celestial city. And the object of its corporate life is to furnish to every citizen the maximum of opportunity to grow Godlike. To Plato the crowning glory of human life, the process by which our mortal nature puts an immortality, is by becoming like to God, *ὅμοιωσις τῷ θεῷ*. And such an ideal in its political application means the establishment of a kingdom of God on earth—a kingdom wherein dwelleth righteousness, *ἐν οἷς δικαιοσύνη κατοικεῖ*.⁴

It is this transcendentalism, common

¹ These chapters belong to the second period of the prophet's ministry, that is, they were written some time within the period which opened six months after the fall of Jerusalem (January, 585 B.C.) and 570 B.C.

² See Cheyne, *Jewish Religious Life after the Exile*, pp. 80 ff.; Montefiore, *The Religion of the Ancient Hebrews* (Hibbert Lectures, 1892) pp. 321 ff.; Skinner, "Ezekiel" (*Expositor's Bible*); Kraetzschmar, *Hand-Kommentar zum Alten Testament*; Cornill, *The Prophets of Israel*, p. 123.

³ *Rep.* 592.

⁴ By "justice" Plato really means righteousness. It is not a pale abstraction but the root and source of all virtue—the condition and the means of growing like to God. See Nettleship, *Lectures and Remains*, II, 221; and Adam, *The Vitality of Platonism*, pp. 66–67.

to Ezekiel and Plato, this faculty of making us

. . . . breathe in worlds
To which the heaven of heavens is but a veil,

that is responsible for a further resemblance between the two commonwealths. Both are ideal pictures, impossible of realization, and were so regarded by their authors. It is significant that most authors of "Utopias," such as More, Bacon, and Campanella, represent their ideal commonwealths as already existing, and needing only to be described, whereas both Ezekiel and Plato present their conception of a perfect state as existent only in thought. Each is content to remain wholly an idealist; neither makes the slightest claim to be a practical politician. Ezekiel's vision of a restored and happy Israel has been called "a sort of Messianic apocalypse, an ideal picture of what ought to come to pass, intended to suggest broad lines of progress rather than to indicate exact details."¹ Professor Cornill has pointed out² that Ezekiel's plan of a theocracy was entirely impracticable; in other words, was possible only when the Jews were a conquered and subject people, governed by a foreign power. Ezekiel tells us³ that he saw the plan of the holy city "in the visions of God," and Plato⁴ also speaks of his city of the perfect as one that exists in idea only, "for I do not think," he adds, "that there is such an one anywhere on earth. In heaven . . . there is laid up a pattern of such

a city; and he who desires may behold this, and beholding, may govern himself accordingly. But whether there really is, or ever will be such an one is of no importance to him; for he will act according to the laws of that city and of no other." "Nothing actually existing in this world," says Professor Jowitt in his introduction to *The Dialogues*, "at all resembles Plato's ideal state, nor does he himself imagine that such a state is possible." When asked how the ideal could be realized, he replied ironically,⁵ "When one son of a king becomes a philosopher," referring to his famous paradox in the *Republic*,⁶ "Until kings are philosophers, or philosophers are kings, cities will never cease from ill." Yet to think of the *Republic* as a mere exercise of fancy without any practical purpose is wholly to misunderstand Plato and his work. Plato, no less than Ezekiel, was trying to "suggest broad lines of progress," even though he did not expect that his own generation would travel very far along the road he had indicated. Asked whether there is any way of making the citizens believe in a certain theory, he answered, "Not in the present generation; I do not see any way of accomplishing this; but their sons may be made to believe, and their son's sons, and posterity after them."⁷

In their theoretical construction of a perfect state of society, and in their attempt to formulate the governing principles that ought to be regnant in that society, both Ezekiel and Plato

¹ Sanders and Kent, *Messages of Later Prophecy*, p. 114.

² *Prophets of Israel*, pp. 123-21.

³ Ezek. 40:2.

⁴ *Rep.* 501.

⁵ *Laws*, Book v.

⁶ *Rep.* 501.

⁷ *Rep.* 415.

wholly ignored existing conditions.¹ Both presupposed a change in the spirit and temper of the citizens who are to form the body politic. Ezekiel assumes that the members of the holy state will, at its beginnings, be people upon whom God has bestowed a new heart and a new mind, so that they will walk in the way of his commandments, and observe his laws. Though he does not assume that they have attained perfection, he does presuppose a citizenship of forgiven and sanctified souls, who err, if at all, only inadvertently. There is no mistaking his meaning:

For I will take you from among the nations, and gather you out of all the countries, and will bring you into your own land. And I will sprinkle clean water upon you and you shall be clean from all your filthiness; and from all your idols, will I cleanse you. A new heart also will I give you, and a new spirit will I put within you, and cause you to walk in my statutes, and you shall keep mine ordinances, and do them.²

This purified citizenship was to be the spiritual charge not of a king, for the function of the king was to disappear with the removal of war, and of the need of a supreme judge, but of a high priest and his subordinate ministers. These were to constitute a priestly caste,³ whose divinely sanctioned office no earthly king could take away. For the preservation of their ritual purity, Ezekiel provides most carefully. They are to wear no woolen garment; they must not approach a corpse, unless it be that of parent, child, brother, or

unmarried sister.⁴ On passing from the inner courts of the Temple, they are to lay aside their garments,⁵ "that they sanctify not the people with their garments," in other words, lest they mingle the sacred and the profane.

Plato, also, assumes that the citizens of the perfect state are to be, in Descartes' famous phrase, "on the side of the angels." Though they are not thought of as having yet attained even to the measurable sanctification assumed by Ezekiel as preliminary to the inauguration of his holy state, Plato does represent them as in a process of becoming lovers of justice under the leadership of philosophers who have themselves passed through a rigorous course of self-discipline. Plato pins his faith to the best instincts of an ethical aristocracy, just as Ezekiel had pinned his to the best instincts of an ecclesiastical aristocracy. Each believed in the collective sense of the most cultivated, most delicately perceptive, most spiritually minded people in the state. The fact that in Ezekiel's thought such a "remnant" meant a priestly aristocracy of morally educated men; and that in Plato's thought⁶ it meant an aristocracy composed of men educated physically, mentally, and morally is due merely to a difference of racial ideals.

But the idealism common to Ezekiel and Plato not only shows itself, in their evident belief in the perfectibility of human nature, but is even more apparent in their formulation of the principles that are to govern the new society.

¹ There is a striking difference in this respect between Plato and Aristotle, whose *Politics* is a practical discussion of the best form of government possible under existing conditions.

² 36:25-29.

³ See W. E. Addis, *Hebrew Religion*, pp. 230 ff.

⁴ 44:25.

⁵ 44:19.

⁶ *Rep.* 537-40.

The laws governing the holy state, as they are given in the last nine chapters of Ezekiel, are wholly ritual, and concern (a) the temple,¹ (b) the priests,² (c) the sacrifice,³ (d) times and seasons, the Sabbath, the new moons, and the three feasts.⁴ This very meager equipment of legislation was not, however, to be the only code possessed by the holy state. Although Ezekiel provides no code of laws for the guidance of the civil life of the community,⁵ because, obviously, with such a citizenship as he presupposes, none was needed, he evidently does assume that the regulations he gives will be supplemented by those embodied in the so-called "holiness code" contained in Leviticus.⁶ Again and again, as when he prescribes the laws that are to govern the life of the priests in the holy state, he expresses himself in terms so nearly identical with those of the Holiness Code as to prove not only that he was familiar with it, but that he regarded it as an authoritative basis of moral and religious life.⁷

A glance at the Holiness Code reveals its uniqueness. No legislation among other peoples, either ancient or modern, in the least resembles it. From them it differs in the fundamental conception

that underlay it, and, consequently, in the spirit of its enactments. The basic idea of Roman law, as expressed in its earliest code—that of the Twelve Tables—is the equality of rights of Roman citizens—"omnibus, summis, infimisque, jura aequare." The fundamental conception of this Hebrew law, on the other hand, was not one of rights, but of duty. Members of the new commonwealth of Israel were not to be, in the eyes of the law, citizens with rights to be conserved, but members of a family with mutual obligations to fulfil; and the obligation that included all the others was that of mutual forbearance and love. It is stated expressly in the Holiness Code:⁸ "Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart. . . . Thou shalt not take vengeance, nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people; but thou shalt love thy brother as thyself: I am Jehovah."⁹

Plato's scheme, though less ecclesiastical than Ezekiel's, is no less moral. Baron Bunsen is said to have remarked that the *Republic* is not so much a state as a church, or at least, a state and a church, and that the church is the superior and dominating element. At all events, Plato recognized that no per-

¹ 45:1-8.

² 44:4-10.

³ 42:13; 43:13-27; 44:24, 27; 45:17—46:11.

⁴ 44:24; 45:17—46:11.

⁵ No law in the modern sense of a body of enacted rules, recognized by a community as binding, existed in ancient Israel. The word the Hebrews used for law, *torah*, meant instruction, guidance, direction. It was a word of far wider application than our word "law," for it included both oral and written instruction, and was a general rule of life.

⁶ Lev., chaps. 17-26.

⁷ For a full list of these correspondences, see Driver, *Introduction to the Literature of Old Testament*, pp. 146-47. These are so numerous as to have led many to believe Ezekiel to have been the author of the Holiness Code.

⁸ Lev. 19; 17-18.

⁹ Some account of the debt of the modern world, both institutional and ethical, to the Priestly Code is given in my article in the *Biblical World* for July, 1912.

manent social life is possible except it be based on morality. Accordingly, we find the necessity of justice between man and man proved in the first of the ten books into which the treatise is divided.

And Plato's idea of justice is as remote from modern notions as Ezekiel's. It is not embodied in a concrete system of law. Indeed Plato's aversion to law is a constant and well-recognized feature of his political thought.¹ It is not surprising, therefore, to find Plato in the *Republic* considering the state as an ethical society, and its life as a moral life. The corporate life of the state he does not think of, any more than Ezekiel did, as based on a conception of rights, nor does he conceive of justice as the maintenance or correlation of the rights of its citizens. Impressed, as the Hebrews had been, with the truth that only the law written in the heart is really binding,² he would have the ruler as unfettered in his action as an artist in his creation. Consequently, both ruler and citizen are amenable to only one law—the law of justice. And justice is the will to concentrate on one's own sphere of duty (*τὸ αὐτοῦ πράττειν*)³ and not to meddle with another's sphere. Justice code not reside, therefore, in an external code, but in the heart of every member of the body politic who does his duty in his appointed place. In other words, the justice of the state is based upon the citizens' sense of duty. Nor is this sense of duty a mere *lumen siccum*, a dry light of reason. It is

inspired by the same inward principle that Ezekiel thought of as regnant in the hearts of the citizens of the holy city—the sense of brotherhood. The three classes into which he would divide society—rulers, soldiers, and workers—are each to be taught that their country is their mother; “they are, therefore, bound to advise for her good, and to defend her against attacks, and her citizens they are to regard as children of the earth, and their own brothers.”⁴

So long as duty, that “stern daughter of the voice of God,” speaks in the heart of each member of the community, both rulers and governed, the legislative function of the state wholly disappears in Plato's scheme, and only the executive function remains. Even this is confined to enforcing certain broad outlines of education. Ezekiel had placed implicit confidence in a “holy” priesthood; Plato relied in turn upon an intelligent board of education. The problem of Ezekiel's state was to make Jerusalem so “holy” a city that Jehovah would feel at home there; the problem of Plato's state was to carry out unchanged the scheme of education laid down by its founder.

Education, according to the Platonic ideal, had the same ultimate goal as Hebrew education—namely, the knowledge of God. Again and again did the Hebrew wise men formulate their belief that growth in wisdom meant a knowledge of God's works and ways here on the earth, and the turning of that knowledge to practical account. To the Hebrew

¹ See Barker, *Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle*, p. 118.

² See Psalm 19.

³ See *Republic* (433): “You will remember the original principle of which we spoke at the foundation of the state, that every man . . . should practice one thing only, that being the thing to which his nature was most perfectly adapted; now justice is either this, or a part of this.”

⁴ *Rep.* 414.

wise man the beginning and end of wisdom was the fear of the Lord, and to depart from evil was understanding.¹ That is, the Hebrew ideal of education was an ethical ideal, and its ultimate goal was righteousness of life.² No less ethical was the Platonic scheme of education, for its purpose is the knowledge of God, and its consummation is the growing like to him, *δροίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ*.³ To Plato, no less than to the Hebrew sage, education meant a growth in righteousness. Speaking of Plato's scheme of education, Barker says:⁴

It is to gain the master-key of conduct and action, since all right conduct and proper action will be conformed and directed to the end which is the end of all things. This is the real sense in which virtue is knowledge. If this conception be personalized, we may say that the end of education is the realization of God: it is knowing that all things are one in Him, and doing in the light of that knowledge.

It is in the seventh book of the *Republic*⁵ that Plato outlines most clearly the stages of this growth in a "knowledge which shows the eternal nature in which is no variableness." One after another, he here enumerates the virtues that will be added, and the vices that will, like soiled garments, be laid aside, till finally the learner becomes ready "to raise the eye of the soul to the universal

light that lightens all things, and behold the absolute good; for that is the pattern according to which they are to order the state, and the lives of individuals, and the remainder of their own lives also."

In view of the fact that Ezekiel's holy state preceded Plato's scheme by nearly two centuries, a protest against designating the latter as the first book of its kind seems entirely justifiable. The reasonableness of such a protest becomes the more apparent upon a brief comparison of the two books, which reveals certain fundamental resemblances between the authors and their work. We find that both Ezekiel and Plato were transcendentalists, that they ignored existing conditions, that they believed in the perfectibility of the social organism through an educated aristocracy. Nor do we find that the resemblance ends with the idealism of the two authors. Each distrusted the efficacy of external law as a means of social betterment; and each substituted a moral principle, to be written, not on tables of stone, nor in the pages of a statute book, but in the fleshly tables of the heart of each loyal citizen. The Hebrew citizen was to be loyal to the ideal of holiness; the Greek, to the ideal of duty; and each, in his relations with his fellows, to the ideal of brotherhood.

Both Ezekiel and Plato have exerted, in somewhat different ways a powerful

¹ Prov. 1:7.

² Pictures illustrative of the Hebrew ideal of the perfectly educated man and woman are found in Job, chap. 31; Prov., chap. 31; and in several of the Psalms.

³ See Adam, *The Vitality of Platonism*, p. 33; Barker, *Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle*, pp. 125-27; Nettleship, *Lectures on the Republic of Plato*, pp. 217 ff.; and Pater, *Plato and Platonism*, pp. 238-40.

⁴ *Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle*, p. 127.

⁵ 485 ff.

influence upon the world's thought. To attempt to decide to which our debt is the greater would be a thankless task. The direct effect upon literature of Plato is probably greater than that of Ezekiel; but the latter has certainly

influenced more vitally the thought of common men. So potent has been his influence, that to continue to ignore the source of it would be blindness; and to continue to discredit it, in comparison with Plato's, would be folly.

THE OLD TESTAMENT AND VITAL RELIGION

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The science of historical interpretation, during the last few decades, has made the Old Testament a new book for most of the present generation of cultivated folk. We do not expect to obtain from it guidance of the same sort as our fathers did, nor do we seek guidance in the same way. We understand perfectly that the Old Testament must be treated exactly like any other piece of literature, in that it must be allowed to tell its own story without let or hindrance. But some of the larger results of the adoption of the historical point of view seem to have failed thus far to find very general recognition. The purpose of the present paper is to lay emphasis upon one or two of these neglected issues.

One of the most significant things in the Old Testament is the attitude toward truth therein reflected. The Old Testament worthies respect the past; yea, reverence it. They never tire of reference to it; they glory in their history. It is to them a never-failing fount of

information and inspiration. They never dream of such a thing as ignoring their traditions. They could not and would not make an absolute break with the accumulated experience of preceding centuries. But, on the other hand, they did not blindly worship the past. They did not allow it to take such complete possession of them as to render them incapable of appreciating the present, or of making progress toward the future. They valued the past for what it had to teach them about God and about life; but they never regarded it as being the repository of all knowledge, or the full and complete guidebook for all time to come. They did not turn their backs toward the future, with their eyes glued upon the past. Their attitude, indeed, was quite the reverse; it was one of expectation, anticipation, hope. They were ever looking eagerly, longingly, confidently for new light to flash forth from above. They were decidedly receptive toward